In a recent article, van Fraassen has taken issue with the use to which Perrin's experiments on Brownian motion have been put by philosophers, especially those defending scientific realism. He defends an alternative position by analysing the details of Perrin's case in its historical context. In this reply, I argue that van Fraassen has not done the job well enough and I extend and in some respects attempt to correct his claims by close attention to the historical details.
question serves to illustrate only more modest claims about how theories can be empirically grounded. My reply is very much in the spirit of van Fraassen's analysis insofar as it recognizes that attention must be paid to the details and historical context of Perrin's argument if it is to be employed in the defence of philosophical claims. However, I appeal to details of Perrin's work to expand on, and in certain respects take issue with, the morals van Fraassen finds supported by it.
I take it for granted that scientific knowledge has a special status that derives from the exacting way in which it is borne out by experiment. I totally endorse van Fraassen's claim that 'the bottom line in the empirical sciences is to meet the criteria of success that relate directly to test and experiment' ([2009], p. 8) . Theses defended by contemporary philosophers under the banner of 'metaphysics' typically go beyond the claims of science. That is, they involve claims that cannot be borne out by experiment in the way that the claims of science are expected to be. To the extent that this is the case, it should not be expected that metaphysical claims can be endorsed by simply generalizing the findings of science. For this reason, I can join with van Fraassen in being wary of 'scientific realism' insofar as that position implies that some very general claims about the nature of reality have the support of science. Claims about the role played by atoms and molecules in the behaviour of gases or in chemical combination are one thing. Claims that reality is or is not ultimately atomic are another thing entirely. My recent study of the history of atomism in (Chalmers [2009] ) is designed to show how important it is to distinguish metaphysical atomism dating back to Democritus from atomism as it enters science beginning in the 19th century. There is plenty of scope for an alliance between van Fraassen and myself on these issues.
While metaphysical claims that go beyond science cannot be vindicated by experiment in the way expected of science, it is possible for science to pose problems for such claims. It can reasonably be demanded of metaphysics that it be compatible with the findings of science. An extreme positivist view to the effect that knowledge of unobservable entities is impossible is undermined by the successes of the kinetic theory, but those particular successes were hardly necessary for such an undermining. The forces involved in Newtonian mechanics and gases such as oxygen and hydrogen in Lavoisier's chemistry are unobservable and, as van Fraassen ([2009] , p. 8) notes, 'although atoms are unobservable, so are the forces and energies postulated in the rival programs of dynamism and energetism'. A serious analysis of the consequences of Perrin's experiments must move beyond the recognition that they clash with positivist resistance to the inclusion of unobservables in science.
Seeking Empirical Grounding for or Testing the Claims of Theories?
Another set of considerations need to be aired before I join van Fraassen in assessing the significance of Perrin's experiments by investigating the details in their historical context. They concern the general issue of what empirical support in science amounts to. Van Fraassen is wary of interpreting science as a search for, or as progressing towards, the truth. He proposes, instead, that we seek the merits of science in the extent to which it is empirically grounded. On this view, a theory is empirically grounded if its parameters can be determined from observation and that independent determinations of them be consistent with each other. I do not deny that this viewpoint can be usefully brought to bear on various moves in science, including aspects of Perrin's experiments, but I regard the viewpoint as partial and insufficient for grasping the point of much experimental testing in science. Putting the claims of a theory to the test can involve, but typically involves more than is captured by, van Fraassen's notion of empirical grounding. Van Fraassen's position on empirical constraints in science adapts discussions of the issue by Clark Glymour ([1980] ), which in turn owed a debt to Hermann Weyl ([1963] ). A central concern that van Fraassen confronts is the extent to which experimental measurements involved when a theory is brought to bear on the phenomena presuppose that very theory. For example, measurements of Newtonian mass by Atwood's machine or a spring balance presuppose Newton's laws of motion. In response, van Fraassen stresses the importance of determinability and concordance. According to the former requirement all parameters involved in a theory must be determinable by measurements if it is to be empirically grounded. According to the second requirement, values of the various parameters acquired by different means must yield the same result. It is the extent to which these criteria can be satisfied in spite of the fact that the measurements involved presuppose the theory under investigation that makes empirical grounding of theories possible.
I do not wish to deny that these considerations can be used to make sense of some moves in the history of science. But I resist raising them to the status of offering the account of how scientific theories are borne out by experiment. From the point of view I endorse, the determination of the parameters involved in a theory is a means to an end, the extension and testing of its empirical content. Once the perspective on empirical testing is broadened in this way, aspects of Perrin's work and of the status of 19th-century atomism generally can be brought to light which are missed by van Fraassen. That is what I intend to show in the analysis of the historical situation that follows.
In his article, van Fraassen ([2009] , p. 7) indicates in a footnote why he opts for assessing theories in terms of the extent to which they are empirically grounded rather than in terms of their truth or even their empirical adequacy. 'The claim of empirical adequacy is like the claim of truth in going far beyond what our evidence could establish, for it entails that there are no phenomena anywhere in the universe or its history that contradict the theory.' But the fact that it is not possible for science to close the logical gap between theories and evidence is not sufficient to rule out truth or empirical adequacy as key aims or regulative ideals. Getting to the bottom of what is at issue here would take us far beyond what can be addressed in this article. What I will do is supply my own version of what van Fraassen does in the article under discussion. That is, I will offer a perspective on the relation between theory and evidence and then show how it can be utilized to throw light on atomism in 19th-century science and the significance of Perrin's transformation of the situation early in the 20th century.
Notwithstanding the logical gap between theory and evidence, a strong case can be made for a theory to the extent that it is borne out by a range of independent evidence. The aim is to mount an argument to the effect that it would be a coincidence were the range of evidence to be the case and the theory false nevertheless. Such arguments from coincidence are not easily come by and conditions need to be satisfied for them to be adequate. A mere fit between theories and evidence will be insufficient. An analysis of the logic of typical test situations reveals the importance of the partitioning of a theory into its various components where possible, with the aim of establishing just which portions of it are necessary to account for evidence, and the importance of independent testability of auxiliary hypotheses. I will say a little about each of these before proceeding to bring them to bear on the experimental testing of atomic theories.
Theories typically involve a range of claims. Consequently, the question arises concerning which parts of a theory are confirmed by some successful prediction. A theory as a whole is not confirmed by a successful prediction if some subset of it is alone sufficient to yield that prediction. Fresnel's theory that light travels as transverse waves in an elastic aether successfully predicted a range of interference, diffraction, and polarization phenomena. But once it is realized that the assumption that light is a transverse wave is sufficient to account for this success, and that the stronger assumption that the waves correspond to states of a mechanical aether is not necessary for it, then it can be appreciated that the evidence does not support Fresnel's theory as a whole. In contemporary work on gravitational theory, physicists explicitly distinguish, for example, between the assumption that space-time is curved and more specific assumptions about the extent and cause of the curvature. The first assumption is sufficient for the prediction of the red shift.
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Consequently, its experimental confirmation should not be taken as confirmation of theories, such as Einstein's, which include a version of the more specific assumptions.
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Ways of partitioning a theory, where it is possible, need not be obvious or easily come-by. Discovering significant ways of partitioning theories and putting the parts to separate test constitute challenges for the scientist. It was not obvious to defenders of the wave theory of light in the 19th century-with the possible exception of Ernst Mach-that light waves need not be waves in a material medium. The fact that it may prove possible in the future, just as in the past, to partition successful theories into confirmed and redundant parts in unexpected ways is one that needs to be accommodated in any stand on scientific realism.
Theories, if they are to be put to the test, need to be augmented by a range of auxiliary assumptions. Testing Newtonian accounts of planetary motions requires, for instance, knowledge of refraction of light in the Earth's atmosphere and detailed knowledge of the Earth's motion that enables observations of planetary positions to be adjusted in a way that accounts for the fact that the position of the Earth-based observer changes over time. A potential problem here is that inadequacies of theory may be camouflaged by suitably devised auxiliaries. An extreme example is the adding of epicycles to Ptolemaic astronomy to ensure fit with the observed planetary positions. The antidote to these problems is to keep auxiliary hypotheses to a minimum and demand that those that remain have stood up to tests independent of the theory to which they are added as auxiliaries. Early versions of the kinetic theory predicted that the viscosity of a gas should vary as the square root of the temperature, conflicting with the experimental finding that it is directly proportional to temperature. Maxwell showed that the theory could be brought into line with experiment by assuming that at short range molecules of a gas repel each other with a force inversely proportional to the fifth power of their separation. This move accommodated the theory to the evidence, but the theory should not be seen as confirmed by the evidence so long as there is no independent evidence for Maxwell's short range repulsive forces.
If a theory in conjunction with independently tested auxiliaries successfully yields a range of predictions of a variety of phenomena that do not follow from some subset of that theory in conjunction with those auxiliaries then it is well-confirmed. It is not thereby established as true in an unqualified sense. But it is at least established as something that needs to be accommodated into any future science in a way that avoids having to admit a range of unexplained coincidences.
3 Atomism and 19th-Century Chemistry I find van Fraassen's discussion of atomism in 19th-century chemistry inadequate from a historical point of view and misleading as far as the relation between it and experimental evidence is concerned. The problem stems in part from his imposition of an account of empirical grounding that is not up to doing the situation justice.
Van Fraassen ([2009] , p. 13) lumps together Daltonian chemistry and the kinetic theory. Now we come to the testing problem of the atomic theory that Dalton introduced early in the nineteenth century, and that was extended into the kinetic theory of heat, finally into the statistical mechanics which rivalled phenomenological thermodynamics. I'll use the term 'kinetic theory' to refer to all that, for short.
As we shall see, in portraying atomic chemistry and the kinetic theory of gases as part of the same quest for knowledge of atoms, van Fraassen falls prey to the kind of peril he is keen to warn philosophers against.
Van Fraassen raises the problem of how Dalton's theory was to be grounded. He focuses on the laws of proportion and points out that the Daltonian explanation of them was under-determined by the experimental evidence on combining proportions. Molecular formulae could be derived from relative atomic weights and vice-versa but Dalton had no way of breaking into the circle. The problem, according to van Fraassen, was resolved by introducing further hypotheses involving atomic or molecular weights, Avogadro's hypothesis that equal volumes of gases at the same temperature and pressure contain equal numbers of molecules, and the law of Dulong and Petit linking atomic weight and specific heat. In the 1830s, the chemist Dumas ran into problems with the attempt to use Avogadro's hypothesis to determine atomic and molecular weights stemming from the so-called anomalous vapour densities, a sure sign for van Fraassen ([2009], p. 16) that to Dumas, 'it seemed, in view of his results, impossible to achieve empirical grounding for its [the atomic theory's] theoretical parameters'. Further development of the kinetic theory-in van Fraassen's broad sense of the term-consisted in 'the addition of specific hypotheses, pertaining to the models of liquids and gases to which it was applied, which implied stricter and stricter connections between the measurable parameters and the parameters pertaining directly to the molecules and their motion ' (van Fraassen [2009], p. 19, italics in original) . It was Perrin, with his experiments on Brownian motion, that 'finished the job' so construed.
This picture seriously misconstrues the nature of 19th-century chemistry and the way in which it progressed. The determination of definitive weights of atoms, relative or otherwise, was not the pressing problem for 19th-century Alan Chalmers chemistry that van Fraassen treats it as. Progress in chemistry, especially in organic chemistry, was made by the deployment of chemical formulae. The demands made on such formulae were such that, as Alan Rocke ([1984] ) has shown in detail, by around 1860 organic chemists arrived at a definitive set of formulae that were up to the task. They solved the problem of under-determination by chemical means in a way that owed no debt to the kinetic theory or to Avogadro's hypothesis. Insofar as this chemistry involved atomism, it was a chemical atomism differing from the atomism advocated by mechanical or Newtonian matter theorists. In fact, the progress in chemistry can be construed as being independent of atomism and consequently offering no support to it.
The atomic theory that John Dalton introduced in 1808 was embedded in a physical theory. Dalton's atoms were subject to repulsive forces varying inversely as their separation in a way that accounted for Boyle's law, they were surrounded by clouds of caloric that implied connections between the theory and specific heats and it also suggested connections between the solubility of gases in liquids and their atomic weight. The initial promise of the theory was not maintained. Within a few years it became incoherent and failed to be supported experimentally. The enduring part of Dalton's theory was its explanation of laws of proportion. Chemists soon learnt to extract this part of the theory from the problematic atomism. In 1813, Berzelius introduced chemical formulae for representing the structure of compounds composed of elements. His initial reason for doing so was that the move enabled the valuable part of Dalton's theory, the laws of proportion, to be expressed in a way that avoided what, at the time, was a problematic commitment to atomism.
2 Van Fraassen ([2009], p. 14) suggests that the appearance of numbers (involved in the simple ratios of weights of elements in compounds) suggests models that are particulate, but such a suggestion is by no means compelling. The symbols in a chemical formula, such as H 2 O for water, can be interpreted as representing atoms, in which case an atomic weight of 16 for oxygen relative to hydrogen implies that an oxygen atom is sixteen times heavier than a hydrogen atom. But the weight of a hydrogen atom need not be taken as the reference weight. The weight of any portion of hydrogen whatsoever can be taken as the reference weight and the symbols in a formula taken as referring to it. On this interpretation the weight of the portion of oxygen which combines with two of the reference portions of hydrogen will be 16 times heavier than each hydrogen portion. The interpretation in terms of portions rather than atoms reflects what was determined in the laboratory by chemists, and is sufficient to account for laws of proportion.
As Ursula Klein ([2003] ), in particular, has shown, dramatic progress in organic chemistry was made from the late 1820s onwards by deploying formulae to represent more than combining weights and volumes. Some structure was introduced into the arrangement of symbols to reflect chemical properties. I illustrate with an example. The simplest formula for acetic acid, given the relative weight of the elements composing it and using the 'correct' atomic weights, is CH 2 O. This is not up to the task of grasping the fact that, in the laboratory, the hydrogen in acetic acid can be replaced by an equal volume of chlorine in four different ways, three of them yielding acids similar to acetic acid, the chloro-acetic acids, and the fourth yielding a chloride. Doubling the numbers in the formula, to obtain C 2 H 4 O 2 and separating one of the hydrogens from the other three, we arrive at the formula C 2 H 3 O 2 H. The formation of the chloro-acetic acids can now be understood as the replacement of one, two or all three of the hydrogens grouped together and the formation of the chloride by the replacement of the lone hydrogen, now seen to be responsible for the acidic properties of acetic acid.
3 By around 1860, the demands put on chemical formulae like the ones in my illustration had led to a unique set of formulae up to the task. Unique formulae, and hence 'atomic and molecular weights' were arrived at by chemical means with no debt to the physics of gases or Avogadro's hypothesis.
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By the end of the 19th century structure was introduced into formulae to accommodate stereo-chemistry. But the three-dimensional arrangement of atoms in a formula did not necessarily mimic arrangements of atoms in space, any more than the fact that the electric field has the symmetry of an arrow and the magnetic field has the symmetry of a spinning disc necessitates the assumption of a stretched aether containing vortices. At the turn of the 19th century, Pierre Duhem ([2002] ) laid down the challenge to chemists to provide evidence that the symbols in chemical formulae represent atoms rather than portions. He partitioned off the assumption of atoms from the rest of chemistry and showed how the predictive success of 19th-century chemistry could do without it. There is an analogy here with the way in which the aether can be partitioned off from the remainder of the wave theory of light. In each case, the challenge that the inclusion of what is partitioned off be justified is a legitimate one. As it happened, the challenge 3 The notion of substitution involved here was introduced by Dumas in the late 1830s. This is the same figure mentioned by van Fraassen in the context of the anomalous vapour densities. For details of the pioneering work of Dumas see (Klein [2003] ). 4 By 1860, Cannizzaro had shown clearly how formulae and atomic weights could be determined by appealing to vapour densities and specific heats as is often remarked. But it is significant that his method yields C 2 H 4 O 2 for acetic acid and not the more informative one suiting the needs of the chemists.
was met in chemistry but not in optics. Atoms have been retained and the aether banished.
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While the situation as outlined by Duhem, and endorsed by me, gives an adequate account of the logic of the situation in the 19th century, this was not how chemists typically saw it at the time. Most of those chemists were atomists insofar as they took the symbols in chemical formulae to represent atoms. However, their position amounted to what Alan Rocke and others refer to as chemical atomism that must be distinguished from the atomism espoused by mechanical philosophers or Newtonian atomists and from atomism as it was beginning to enter physics. Chemical atoms were the least parts of chemical elements. They were assumed to combine together to form compounds. The key difference between them and physical atoms was that the properties to be attributed to them were not set down in advance by embedding them in some mechanical philosophy or physical theory but were seen as needing to be discovered by experimental research. The need to attribute valency to atoms had emerged by the 1860s in a way that posed headaches for mechanical interpretations rather than flowing from them. From the outset of atomic chemistry, it was clear that atoms needed to possess properties that determined how they combined together. If we follow van Fraassen and insist that the parameters of theories need to be empirically grounded then the mode of combination of atoms was in need of such grounding to at least the same degree as their relative weights. As it happened, as we have seen, the latter problem was solved by establishing formulae, a move that also shed light on, but by no means solved the former one.
My inclusion of this lengthy section on the history of chemistry is in part motivated by the historical inadequacy of van Fraassen's asides about chemistry in the article in question. The history is more complicated and more interesting than van Fraassen's treatment implies. But there are more fundamental issues at stake. Duhem issued the challenge to provide evidence that the symbols in chemical formulae refer to atoms, clearly believing that it had not and could not be met. But it was met, and the most significant evidence that enabled it to be met were Jean Perrin's experiments on Brownian motion, as we shall see. There is a second point that involves an important qualification of the extent of Perrin's achievement. A failing of atomic chemistry throughout the 19th century had been the lack of an account of how atoms and molecules combine. Perrin's experiments offered nothing by way of a solution to that problem.
Perrin's Experimental Findings: Partitioning and Independent Tests
To capture the structure of the experimental case involved in Perrin's investigations of Brownian motion it is instructive to distinguish clearly between conclusions based on observation of the Brownian particles and those that invoked the kinetic theory. When this is done a grasp of the sense in which Perrin's experimental investigation was theory dependent can be developed in a way that is somewhat more nuanced that that provided by van Fraassen, and correspondingly more instructive. In the following I concentrate mainly on Perrin's investigation of the density distribution of the Brownian particles, but the detailed mode of analysis could readily be extended to his investigation of the time dependence of the mean displacement and mean rotation of the particles.
The material of the Brownian particles is denser than the liquid in which they are suspended and yet, once equilibrium has been reached, there are particles that remain suspended and do not sink. This can be explained if the average number of suspended particles per unit volume, assumed to be in random motion, decreases with height. On this assumption, the number of particles striking a thin horizontal layer in the bulk of the liquid from below will exceed the number striking it from above and there will be a resultant pressure urging the particles upwards. Equilibrium will be reached when this upwards pressure balances the weight of the particles acting downwards. This equilibrium condition can be straightforwardly and quantitatively worked out. The pressure on a surface due to the impact of particles is an exercise in Newtonian mechanics plus the statistics that enables the appropriate averaging to be carried out using techniques that had been developed by Maxwell in the context of the kinetic theory.
The expression for the upwards pressure is (1/3)(n/V)mc 2 , where n is the number of Brownian particles in volume V, m is their mass and c 2 is the mean value of the square of the velocity of the particles. This can be rewritten as (2/3)(n/V)W, where W is the mean kinetic energy of the particles. This upward pressure has to be equated to the net, downwards, weight of the particles per unit area. Doing this yields the expression
Here, n 0 /n represents the ratio of the concentration of particles at two levels separated by a height h, r is the radius of the particles and Á represents the excess of the density of the material of the Brownian particles over that of the fluid in which they are suspended. The exponential variation of particle density with height shown by this equation was confirmed experimentally by Perrin. Further, since, thanks to his experimental ingenuity, he was able to Alan Chalmers measure r and Á as well as the variation of particle density with height, Perrin was able to calculate the value of W, the mean kinetic energy per unit volume of particles at the temperature, T, of the experiment. The analysis summarized above is an exercise in Newtonian mechanics plus statistics. It does not involve the kinetic theory. It is important to clarify just how much Perrin was able to achieve at that level. We have seen that he was able to show that the density of Brownian particles is distributed exponentially in just the way that the Newtonian analysis predicts. We have also seen that Perrin was able to calculate the mean kinetic energy, W, of Brownian particles from measurable quantities. This enabled him to demonstrate that the value for W depends only on the temperature. It is independent of the size of the particles and the nature of the material of which they are composed and of the nature of the fluid in which they are suspended. Further, the assumption involved in the application of statistics in Perrin's theoretical analysis was put to direct test in a number of ways. Perrin showed that the agitation of Brownian particles is indeed random with demonstrations that Deborah Mayo ([1996] , pp. 228-9) has described as 'statistical overkill'. What Perrin's experiments on density distribution in effect demonstrated was that kinetic energy is distributed equally amongst the translational degrees of freedom of particles of various sizes and weights. Perrin's experiments on the mean translation and rotation of Brownian particles, carried out in the light of Einstein's theoretical analysis of 1905, enabled these conclusions concerning equipartition of energy to be carried further. The assumptions involved in Einstein's analysis of the mean displacement of particles appealed to Newtonian mechanics and statistics. Einstein's expression for the mean displacement of a particle assumes the motion of the particles to be random and impeded by a force given by Stokes' law. Perrin showed experimentally that the mean displacement of a Brownian particle was proportional to the square root of the time in line with Einstein's prediction. He was also able to calculate the mean kinetic energy of the particles, since Einstein's expression for that displacement showed that energy to be dependent on the mean displacement, the viscosity of the suspending liquid and the radius of the particles, all of which Perrin could measure. The agreement of the results with those acquired by way of the density distribution gave support to Perrin's case in line with van Fraassen's notion of concordance. Measurements of the mean rotation of the particles gave Perrin a way of measuring the mean rotational energy of the particles. He was able to show that the mean rotational energy was equal to the mean kinetic energy for a specified temperature. Energy is equally distributed amongst the rotational and translational modes.
It is important at this stage to recognize that it is misguided to portray Perrin's arguments as I have summarized them above as 'theory-dependent'.
It is true that the analysis applied Newtonian theory to calculate the pressure arising from the impact of particles. But attributing the pressure on a surface to the change of momentum of particles striking it was not contentious. The randomness of the motions of Brownian particles assumed in the statistical analysis was confirmed by experiment, as we have noted. To do this, Perrin used his ultra-microscope to observe and record successive positions of a Brownian particle after equal time intervals of around 30 seconds or so and subjected the observed displacements to a range of statistical analyses. Both the experimentation and theoretical analysis involved ingenuity but not the assumption of anything usefully described as 'theory'. The same goes for Perrin's measurements of the radius of particles and the density of the resin that composed them. In the first case, Perrin used three and in the second case two, different methods to arrive at values for these quantities and demanded that they yielded concordant results. In only one case were the methods involved 'theory-dependent' in a significant sense, and Perrin recognized this and took pains to deal with it. In his first paper on Brownian motion, reporting his measurements of density distribution, Perrin calculated the radius of the particles from their rate of fall assuming Stokes' law for falling spheres. Einstein had also assumed Stokes' law in his calculation of mean displacement in his 1905 paper. Both authors were criticized for assuming the law since it had been confirmed experimentally only for larger bodies whose radius could be straightforwardly measured while its theoretical derivation assumed the viscous force resisting the motion of a particle varies continuously over the surface of a sphere, hardly an unproblematic assumption for a proponent of the kinetic theory. Perrin accepted the force of the criticism, recognising the need for independent evidence for the applicability of the law to particles as small as those in his suspensions. He devised two, more direct, methods of estimating the radius of his particles. The concordance of the three methods removed the doubt, and, incidentally, gave the use of Stokes' law in calculating the mean displacement the independent support that it had previously lacked. Given the uncontentious character of the low-level assumptions involved in Perrin's experimental measurements and the concordance of the results of alternative modes of measurement of the same quantity, there is a strong sense in which the results of those measurements were 'up to nature' to use the phrase aptly employed by van Fraassen ([2009] , p. 21).
Let us take stock. Having prepared suspensions of Brownian particles of uniform size using a state-of-the art centrifuge and by observing them using the recently-invented ultra-microscope Perrin was able to show that their density distribution and their mean displacement and rotation were in accordance with the assumption that the particles were in random motion and obeyed Newton's laws. He was also able to measure, in a number of mutually supportive ways, the mean kinetic and rotational energy of the particles. He showed that this energy was equally distributed over the translational and rotational degrees of freedom and was dependent only on the temperature and independent of the size and nature of the material of the particles and of the nature of the suspending fluid. None of these conclusions required appeal to the kinetic theory.
Testing the Kinetic Theory
We now proceed to investigate ways in which Perrin's experiments offered support to the kinetic theory. I argue that what was especially significant about Perrin's argument, and distinguished it qualitatively from previous support for the kinetic theory, was the extent to which he appealed only to the central and most basic assumptions of the kinetic theory. It was precisely this characteristic the made it possible to direct the successes and failures of the predictions of the theory to those basic assumptions. This contrasts with the position stressed by van Fraassen ([2009] , p. 19, italics in original).
What does not change in the story, however, is the point that I have been emphasizing: the development of the kinetic theory consisted in the addition of specific hypotheses, pertaining to the models of liquids and gases to which it was applied, which implied stricter and stricter connections between the measurable parameters and the parameters pertaining directly to the molecules and their motion. The result of these additions is that relative to the theory the empirical measurements take on a special significance . . .
According to the kinetic theory a gas consists of a system of molecules in random motion colliding with each other and the walls of the containing vessel in ways governed by Newton's laws of motion. Temperature is identified with the mean kinetic energy of the molecules. The molecules of the various components of a system in thermal equilibrium, be they gases, liquids, or solids, will have the same mean kinetic energy corresponding to the equilibrium temperature. The equidistribution of kinetic energy among the colliding molecules is basic to how thermal equilibrium and temperature is understood in the theory. There is a more general sense in which energy is equally distributed the necessity of which can be understood in general terms. The maintenance of a system at a constant temperature implies that the mean kinetic energy of its molecules remain constant, on average. However, given that the collisions are Newtonian, it must happen that, on collision, kinetic energy is gained or lost through interaction with the inner motions of the molecules, both rotational and vibrational. Since, at constant temperature, the mean kinetic energy is constant, there must be, on average, as much kinetic energy lost as gained as a result of molecular collisions. This happens when energy is equally distributed amongst the translational, rotational and vibrational modes.
My analysis of the previous paragraph has stressed the extent to which Perrin arrived at a range of results that were not 'relative to the theory'. I now proceed to investigate how Perrin used these results to probe the adequacy of the basic assumptions of the kinetic theory without the need for auxiliary assumptions.
As we have seen, Perrin had shown experimentally that the motions of Brownian particles change randomly, that the mean kinetic energy of those particles depends only on temperature and that their mean energy of rotation is equal to their mean kinetic energy. All this follows naturally from the central assumptions of the kinetic theory. Given the random motion of molecules presumed by that theory, a system of Brownian particles differs from a gas only in degree, but not in kind, the particles differing from molecules only insofar as they have a much greater mass. Accordingly, the random motions of the molecules will be communicated to the particles in such a way that energy is equidistributed amongst translational and rotational modes. The observable random motion of the Brownian particles is the result of statistical fluctuations in the results of the many collisions experienced by a particle as it is bombarded by molecules coming from all directions. The kinetic theory predicts a range of phenomena associated with Brownian motion borne out by experiment. To this extent, we have a powerful argument from coincidence in favour of the theory.
Support for the kinetic theory did not stop there. Appealing to only the most general assumptions of the kinetic theory, Perrin was able to calculate Avogadro's number, N, from measurable features of Brownian motion. He did this in three different ways, the results agreeing amongst themselves and with values for N that had been previously obtained by other means. Let us rehearse the structure of Perrin's case.
From the point of view of the kinetic theory, the difference between a gas and a system of randomly moving Brownian particles is only one of degree, as we have noted. The expression P ¼ (2/3) nW/V for the dependence of pressure on mean kinetic energy, W, derived on the assumption that colliding bodies obey Newton's laws applies as much to a gas as to a system of Brownian particles. What is more, equipartition of kinetic energy can be assumed to apply alike to molecules and the system of Brownian particles with which they interact via collisions. Once the basics of the kinetic theory are assumed, it can be appreciated that by measuring the mean kinetic energy of observable Brownian particles at some temperature, T, Perrin had in effect measured the mean kinetic energy of the molecules of a gas at that temperature, T. Knowing that enabled him to derive a value for Avogadro's number. This is made possible by exploiting the gas law, PV ¼ (n/N)RT, where R is the gas constant per gram-molecule and n/N is the number of gram-molecules. 6 Combination of this expression with the expression linking P to W yields N ¼ 3RT/2W. The three ways in which Perrin was able to estimate W, via the density distribution, mean displacement and mean rotation of particles, gave him three ways of measuring N.
I wish to stress a number of general features of Perrin's argument. My first point highlights the way in which Perrin's experiments were able to probe into the heart of the kinetic theory. Perrin ([1910] , p. 526) himself referred to the equipartition of energy together with Maxwell's law for the distribution of velocities-a technical expression for what I have been referring to as the 'random motion' of molecules and Brownian particles-as 'the central point of the mathematical theory of molecular motion '. 7 This 'central point' is all that Perrin required of the kinetic theory for his calculations of N. This represented a qualitative difference between Perrin's estimates of N and those that had preceded it. For example, Loschmidt estimated a value for N from measurements of the viscosity of a gas on the assumption that the molecules of such a gas, when it is liquefied, are closely packed spheres. The equation he used connecting the viscosity of a gas with molecular parameters involved simplifying assumptions while the assumption that gaseous molecules are spheres had to be false for most gases insofar as chemical formulae reflect physical arrangements of atoms. No such assumptions were involved in Perrin's three sets of determinations of N. This is why Perrin ([1910] , pp. 555-6) stressed that his determinations of N were in principle capable of indefinite precision whereas no degree of experimental care could compensate for the dubious theoretical assumptions involved in previous estimates. Perrin gave three independent ways of measuring N that involved assuming only the central assumptions of the kinetic theory with no need for additions of specific hypotheses of the kind regarded as crucial by van Fraassen. 6 The introduction of the notion of a gram-molecule or mole into the gas equation need not involve a commitment to molecules. The move requires only the molecular weights that, as we have seen, can be deduced from chemical formulae arrived at by chemical means. The notion of a mole was in fact introduced by Wilhelm Ostwald at a time when he was opposed to atomic chemistry. Perrin ([1910] , p. 516) defined a gram-molecule as that volume of a substance that, in the gaseous state, occupies the same volume as 2 g of hydrogen at the same temperature and pressure. Once the kinetic theory is assumed, the equality of N for all gases is a consequence of the equidistribution of kinetic energy. 7 I am unhappy with some recent discussions of the significance of Perrin's experiments for scientific realism, by Sherrilyn Roush ([2005] ) and Kyle Stanford ([2009] ), insofar as they take random motion only as being the key assumption of the kinetic theory, leaving equidistribution out of their discussion. Stanford is able to offer an alternative to molecular collisions as the cause of the randomness of the motions of Brownian particles. But there was much more to Perrin's argument than that as my presentation in this paper should make clear. I defy Stanford to offer an alternative to the kinetic theory that will explain the totality of Perrin's results.
My second general point takes issue with van Fraassen's focus on Perrin's measurement of N as supplying empirical grounding for the kinetic theory simply by measuring a parameter that had not previously been measured. I suggest it is more appropriate to see Perrin's determination of N as a means to an end, namely, testing the claims of the kinetic theory. It was to this end that Perrin dramatized the significance of the agreement of his first measurement of N, via the density distribution, with previous estimates of that number. Here are Perrin's own words ([1910] , p. 554):
I do not think this agreement can leave any doubt as to the origin of the Brownian movement. To understand how striking this result is, it is necessary to reflect that, before this experiment, no one would have dared to assert that the fall of concentration would not be negligible in the minute height of some microns, or that, on the contrary, no one would have dared to assert that all the granules would not finally arrive at the immediate vicinity of the bottom of the vessel. The first hypothesis would lead to the value of zero for N, while the second would lead to the value infinity. That, in the immense interval which a priori seems possible for N, the number found should fall precisely on a value so near to the value predicted, certainly cannot be considered a result of chance.
The situation can be further dramatized. The equations into which Perrin fed his measurements followed from the central tenets of the kinetic theory, while, given the stringent experimental demands Perrin put on those measurements, there was a strong sense in which the measurements themselves were given 'by nature', as I stressed in the previous section, joining van Fraassen in this respect. We can understand why Perrin ([1913] , p. 104) greeted 'with the liveliest emotion' the agreement of the value for N that emerged with previous estimates. It is significant that the section of his paper in which Perrin describes his first determination of N is headed, not 'Determination of Avogadro's number', as van Fraassen's analysis might lead us to expect but, rather 'Molecular agitation is indeed the cause of the Brownian movement'. In line with my interpretation, Perrin opens the paragraph following the one reproduced above as follows: 'Thus the molecular theory of the Brownian movement can be regarded as experimentally established, and, at the same time, it becomes very difficult to deny the objective reality of molecules'. The italics are Perrin's own.
These claims concerning the establishment of the molecular theory of Brownian motion and the reality of molecules, made here in connection with the investigations of the density distribution, were yet further supported by the subsequent measurements of N via mean displacement and mean rotation. It should also be stressed that, once Perrin has argued that the motions of Brownian particles can be traced back to the molecular motions that constitute heat, the spontaneous rising of a particle constitutes a violation Alan Chalmers of the second law of thermodynamics. As Clark ([1976] , pp. 93-8) has stressed, Perrin provided evidence for statistical fluctuations that violate the second law in a way predicted by the kinetic theory, a feature of the theory that had led some energeticists to reject it.
In spite of Perrin's successes, we should not assume without qualification that the kinetic theory was shown to be true. In fact there were phenomena with which that theory clashed and was known to clash. The most serious ones involved the measurements of the ratio of the principal specific heats of gases. The circumstance helps to bring out the significance of partitioning the claims of a theory and putting them to separate test.
The kinetic theory predicts that the ratio of the principal specific heats of a gas be equal to (n + 2)/n, where n is the number of degrees of freedom of its molecules. Since molecules possess three translational modes, three rotational modes plus a number of vibrational modes, as signalled by the lines in the spectra of gases, the predicted value of the ratio approaches unity as the number of vibrational modes increases. This prediction clashes with experimentally measured values which are around 1.4 for many gases and significantly greater than one for all gases. James Clerk Maxwell observed on a number of occasions that this constituted a major shortcoming of the kinetic theory. For instance, commenting on the difficulty in a book review, Maxwell ([1877] , p. 245) judged that it was 'likely to startle us out of our complacency, and perhaps ultimately drive us out of all the hypotheses in which we have hitherto found refuge into that state of thoroughly conscious ignorance which is the prelude to every real advance in knowledge'. Maxwell was able to recognize that the specific heats problem spelt real trouble for the kinetic theory because the failed predictions followed from its central tenet, the equidistribution of energy.
Perrin did not discuss the violation of equidistribution in his 1909 review article but he did so in his book Atoms published four years later. There Perrin ([1913] , p. 67) described the specific heats problem as 'a fundamental difficulty' that can be removed 'only by postulating a new and rather peculiar property of matter' and noted that, at sufficiently low temperatures, equidistribution breaks down for rotational as well as vibrational modes (ibid., p. 73). Perrin (ibid., pp. 69ff) considered the quantization of energy as offering a possible solution.
The Status and Significance of the Kinetic Theory after Perrin's Experiments
There is a range of reasons why we should be wary of the claim that Perrin's experiments established the truth of the atomic structure of matter as characterized by the kinetic theory. If this is van Fraassen's main point then I have no quarrel with it. We have already seen that the equidistribution of energy, central to the kinetic theory, was refuted by measurements of the specific heats of gases. As stressed by van Fraassen (p. 8), other problems arose when it came to the detailed match between the theory and a range of phenomena, especially transport phenomena. Attempts to tackle these problems often involved adding counter-factual claims to the theory, such as point or spherical molecules, and were, in any case, often unsuccessful. Even if these difficulties are ignored, the kinetic theory cannot be taken as supplying the last word on the ultimate structure of matter because, by the time of Perrin's experiments, there was already strong evidence for the inner structure of atoms and molecules and doubts concerning the extent to which classical physics could cope with the details. Again, van Fraassen ([2009] , p. 8) alludes to this point. The difficulties with the kinetic theory notwithstanding, Perrin provided powerful arguments from coincidence for the claims that matter is made up of molecules in ceaseless motion and that this accounts for detailed features of Brownian motion. His experimental investigations also gave direct evidence for statistical violations of the second law of thermodynamics predicted by the kinetic theory. How should we comprehend these major successes as well as serious shortcomings of the kinetic theory? In 1911, the leading physicists in the world met at the Solvay Conference to discuss the basic problems that were confronting the physics of the time. What kind of information did they need in order to fathom how they should proceed? I suggest that the answer, crudely put in a way that will make perfect sense to a scientist but will probably not satisfy a philosopher, is that they needed to know what classical physics gets right, and how, and what classical physics gets wrong, and how. These two bodies of information put constraints on and gave pointers to the new physics that was rapidly becoming seen as necessary. Perrin's experiments can been seen in that light. He was able to show that the kinetic theory gets things right to the extent that there can be no serious doubt that there are molecules whose motions are the cause of Brownian motion and the pressure of gases. On the other hand, his work, in conjunction with that on the specific heats of gases, serves to highlight the significance of breakdowns in the equidistribution of energy for vibrational modes and eventually for rotational modes also.
8 From this point of view, Perrin's work can be seen as a contribution to the beginnings, rather than the culmination, of a major advance in physics. A further aspect of the significance of Perrin's experiments takes us back to chemistry. We have seen that progress in 19th-century chemistry, involving the deployment of chemical formulae, did not necessitate the acceptance of atoms and molecules. Any reticence chemists had toward atoms and molecules on this score became inappropriate in the light of Perrin's experiments. That work removed doubt about the existence of molecules insofar as their motions were shown to be the cause of Brownian motion, and the relative molecular weights that could be measured via the kinetic theory were the same as those arrived at by chemical means. Chemical reactions involve the interactions of atoms and molecules and the structures exhibited by chemical formulae are atomic structures. However, it is important to again recognize that, at the time of Perrin's experiments, we have here the beginning of a story rather than the end of one. From the beginning of modern atomic chemistry with Dalton, it was clear that atoms and molecules must possess properties that account for their characteristic modes of combination. In van Fraassen's terminology, they were theoretical parameters in need of measurement. Organic chemists had been able to deploy formulae to guide them in a way that bypassed the problem. Later in the 19th century chemical thermodynamics opened a way for dealing with the direction and speed of chemical reactions that bypassed it too. While Perrin removed any remaining doubt that there are molecules, the way in which they combined remained an open question. If van Fraassen ([2009] , p. 23) is right that to properly credential a theory 'the procedures that count as tests and measurements in the eyes of the theory must provide an empirical grounding for all its significant parameters' then the first decades of the twentieth century marked only the bare beginnings of an adequate atomic chemistry. After Perrin absolute as well as relative weight of molecules could be readily accessed, but one cannot do much chemistry with those! Van Fraassen ([2009] , p. 5) is critical of what he calls the 'lore' concerning the significance of Perrin's experiments on Brownian motion that he attributes particularly to philosophers who wish to utilize the episode in support of realism.
LORE: until the early 20th century there was insufficient evidence to establish the reality of atoms and molecules, but then Perrin's experimental results on Brownian motion convinced the scientific community to believe they are real.
On my reading of the episode there are grounds for accepting a version of this lore, van Fraassen's analysis notwithstanding. There are two ways in which my modification of van Fraassen's account favours acceptance of a version of the lore. First, I have stressed the extent to which Perrin required to assume only the most general assumptions of the kinetic theory to draw conclusions about the reality of the molecular motions causing Brownian motion and not additional and hazardous auxiliary assumptions of the kind highlighted by van Fraassen. Perrin made a case for the reality of molecules that was qualitatively more powerful than anything preceding it. Second, I have followed Duhem and stressed the extent to which chemistry at the turn of the 19th century did not give a conclusive reason for accepting atoms and molecules, so the 'insufficient evidence' invoked in the lore was not a historical myth. Perrin gave chemistry a case for the reality of atoms and molecules that it had previously lacked.
In his version of the lore, van Fraassen portrays Perrin's experiments as sufficient to convince the scientific community of the reality of atoms. I am more inclined to focus on the strength of the argument rather than the effect the argument had on the community. Most of the scientific community were convinced by the 19th-century case for the aether, but, as I have mentioned above, the case was a weak one and the aether was soon abandoned once this had been clarified. In 1910, chemistry plus the results of Perrin's experiments made possible a case for the reality of atoms and molecules in chemistry that was not of the kind that could be negated by future research. The arguments from coincidence involved were too strong for that to be feasible.
I have defended a version of lore as characterized, and rejected, by van Fraassen. However, there are a number of ways in which the significance of Perrin's case needs to be qualified and these are in the spirit of what I take to be van Fraassen's criticism of lore. While Perrin showed molecules to be real he did not thereby give us a true and exhaustive theoretical characterization of them. Atomic and molecular theory immediately after Perrin was both inadequate and incomplete. It was inadequate insofar as it was refuted by specific heat measurements and could not easily be accommodated to a range of transport phenomena and it was incomplete insofar as many properties of atoms and molecules, such as those responsible for phenomena studied in chemistry and spectroscopy, remained unidentified. It was already becoming apparent by 1910 that atoms and molecules had a structure, especially an electron structure, and that the behaviour of these structures was becoming increasingly problematic for classical physics. Perrin's arguments did not yield 'the truth' if that is taken to refer to a complete and adequate account of the ultimate structure of molecular reality. To the extent that the case for a scientific theory is an experimental one, it should only be expected that it will become in need of radical modification or replacement once experiment is pushed into new areas or to extended degrees of accuracy. This tells against the plausibility of the claim that science provides, or even approaches, a true description of ultimate reality.
The Perrin episode is incompatible with a positive position that would put knowledge of the unobservable beyond the capabilities of science and also with the idea that science provides, or even progresses towards, a true description of ultimate reality. I suspect that critics of van Fraassen's 'constructive empiricism'-wrongly-take him to be defending a version of the former while van Fraassen takes 'Scientific Realists'-with capital letters-to be advocating a version of the latter. An adequate account of how science grapples with reality and comes to know about atoms and their inner structure must lie somewhere in between these extremes, although a precise formulation of what the via media amounts to presents a challenge that I do not attempt to rise to in this article.
9 I agree with van Fraassen that if we are to use episodes such as that involving Perrin's experiments to defend some realist or other account of science, a precondition is that we get the arguments and their historical context straight. I have suggested that van Fraassen has not altogether avoided the perils of doing otherwise and I have attempted to improve on his efforts. 
